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TEACHING MIRANDA
Sidney L. Harring*
Teaching Miranda' is just about the most difficult and challenging thing that I do as a law professor. The case is a conundrum on virtually every level. It is probably the only United
States Supreme Court case that has achieved a kind of folk status
as a result of television cop shows and political campaigns. Beyond this folk status is an equally large place in constitutional
law: Miranda is our most cited and used constitutional law case.
Simply calling up the name on Westlaw produces 797 screens of
citations. If Shepardized, the case produces 54 tightly printed
pages of citations-33,264 reported cases if calculated mathematically rather than counted-and who would count so many
cases? 2 Obviously, if it is used so much, it must be of great legal
importance to many people. This reflects the central place Miranda occupies in our criminal justice process, a crucial intersection between police investigation and citizens' rights. That a
criminal procedure case is the most cited constitutional law case
speaks to the underside of our social order. While our Constitution guarantees such lofty and important human rights as free
speech, freedom of religion, and the juridical equality of all people, somehow these rights have become less immediate than a set
of problems centering on crime control.3 As though this were
not enough, the case is one of the few Supreme Court cases that
arouses political passion in local elections as well as in presidential campaigns. For example, the Reagan Administration was politically committed to overruling the case. All this confusion is
* Professor of Law, City University of New York at Queen's College. B.A., Ma-

calester College 1968; M.S. Macalester College 1970; J.D., University of Wisconsin
1972; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin 1976.
I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 I had Miranda Shepardized through November 1991. This calculation is
based on my count of 77 cases per column and 8 columns per page.
3 For example, Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the
landmark case in civil rights law, has fewer citations than Miranda. While it is clear
that civil rights has a direct impact on more people, the law of criminal procedure
produces more cases not only because of the severity of the penal sanction, but also
because the criminally accused must have access to lawyers at state expense, while

those whose civil liberties are denied lack parallel access.
4 A memorandum setting forth the Administration's rationale for arguing that
Miranda should be overruled was widely circulated among law professors. The document, from Stephen J. Markman, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Pol-
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reflected in law and legal process. Miranda is suspect law; many
judges and lawyers, perhaps a majority, look upon it with disfavor, and it is ready for overruling by the United States Supreme
Court. Dozens of Supreme Court opinions have eroded the core
meaning of the case. 5 While the case fares considerably better
among legal scholars, with well over a hundred law review articles that largely defend the doctrine, this literature has permeated neither the case law nor the classroom, to say nothing of the
popular and political understanding of Miranda.6
The classroom Miranda involves all this, plus more immediate student concerns. Just learning the "black letter" Mirandathe holding of the case itself, as modified by the major cases
which have interpreted it-takes a number of class hours. These
modifying cases, in turn, carry their own complexity and politics,
each with intricacies moving beyond Miranda which, for all of its
110 pages and far-reaching implications, is a relatively straightforward case. Thus, just a careful classroom discussion
12
of Innis, 7 Perkins,' Burbine,9 Mosley,

I°

Edwards,''Bradshaw,

icy, to Attorney General Edwin Meese, dated February 12, 1986, represented
Reagan Administration policy on criminal justice as part of a larger "Truth in Criminal Justice" series. Report to the Attorney Generalon the Law of PretrialInterrogation,22
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437 (1989). Other commentators have analyzed the political
context of the case. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS (1983).
5 Here I specifically defer to the extensive scholarly literature on Miranda and
do not discuss how the case has fared under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. See
infra note 6.
6 YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS:

ESSAYS IN LAW AND

(1980) is the most important scholarly work on Miranda. Kamisar's scholarship influenced the original Miranda decision and remains among the most important contributions to criminal law and criminal procedure in recent years. Any
introduction to this literature must start with Kamisar's work and its counterpart,
FRED E. INBAU ET AL, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986), the
famous "how-to" manual for police. ChiefJustice Earl Warren relied heavily on an
earlier edition of this manual in demonstrating the evils of police interrogation
methods. Beyond these works, any reference to particular law review articles is
only a sampling, showing the range of issues raised in the scholarly debate over the
case. See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985);
Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1
(1986); Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator
and Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662 (1986); Welsh S. White, Police
Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979); Daniel Yeager, Rethinking Custodial Interrogation,28 AM. CRIM. L. REV 1 (1990); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Confessions, Criminals and Community, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 327 (1991).
7 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). Innis began a line of cases interpreting Miranda that defines the modern Miranda doctrine. Somewhere between
twenty and thirty cases are normally taught closely, with individual teachers emphasizing more or fewer of these cases. Scholars are largely in complete agreement
about which are the major cases, and the casebooks differ insignificantly in which
POLICY
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Brewer,13 Massiah,'4 Tucker, 1 5 Fulminante,16 and at least a dozen
other cases is a tedious effort. This "black letter" Miranda is, in
turn, inseparable from a constitutional Miranda, a case with complex roots in the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Each
of these amendments embodies its own set of doctrines and policies that are difficult to understand and even contradictory. Finally, aside from all of this, Miranda, as much as any case that can
be taught, is about values: moral issues that deeply divide our
students and our society.
The classroom Miranda normally occurs as only one part of a
one semester course in criminal procedure, usually an elective
that covers a number of topics, including search and seizure and
right to counsel, as well as other procedural topics, or individual
stages of the criminal trial process. My initial choice to teach Miranda in considerable detail necessarily structures the rest of the
course. Rather than teaching a criminal procedure course that
surveys all of the procedural stages of the criminal process, I
teach a course that focuses on constitutional criminal procedure.
With a few references to the Fourteenth Amendment, I primarily
teach only Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment constitutional
law. Miranda, within its larger Fifth Amendment context, is about
one third of the course, encompassing five weeks or twelve and a
half hours.17 Even this is not much time considering what needs
to be covered.
they chose to emphasize, with depth, not mode of analysis, being the major consideration in making choices about inclusion or exclusion.
8 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
9 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
10 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
11 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
12 Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
'3 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
14 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
15 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
16 Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
17 Here a few more details of my specific course might be helpful. The course is
a second or third year elective at C.U.N.Y. Law School, but is taken by most students. Enrollment runs from thirty-five to sixty students per semester. As a
casebook I use RONALD J. ALLEN AND RICHARD B. KUHNS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (199 1), a particularly well-edited text that focuses on Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendment constitutional law. Although Miranda is the last of the major
presentations in this text, I teach it either at the beginning of the course, to establish a framework, or in the middle of the course, following a foundational month on
Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases. I use the socratic method, encouraging
student discussion, but relying entirely on volunteers.
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DIRTY HARRY

Miranda is about cops using coercive methods to catch (and
convict) rapists-and robbers, murderers, and criminals generally. The fear of police abuse of the accused was at the core of
the case, developed in the first section of the opinion, immediately after a statement of the holding. This deep-seated fear of
inquisitorial police practices was repeated throughout the case:
"overzealous police practices";' 8 "beating, hanging, whipping
. sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado;"' 9
"only recently . . .the police brutally beat, kicked and placed
lighted cigarette butts on the back of a potential witness under
interrogation ....
.20 While first discussing the core of this abuse
as physical abuse, specifically police beatings and torture of suspects, Chief Justice Earl Warren, who wrote the opinion of the
divided (5 to 4) Court, quickly moved on to psychological abuse.
In his view, trickery, psychological coercion and other forms of
psychological domination were more common than physical
abuse, but equally dangerous: "'Coercion can be mental as well
as physical.' "2 As examples of this police behavior, police
manuals were cited to demonstrate the types of psychological coercion that were standard police practice.22
This official behavior is dangerous for several unrelated reasons. The unreliability of coerced confessions looms large in
Fifth Amendment folklore because innocent people might confess. But a larger concern emerging from Miranda was a focus on
the integrity of the police process, a fear that the police institution might degenerate into a vicious and unlawful enterprise. All
of these police actions, however, occur in secret, in the bowels of
the police station: "Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our
knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation
rooms." 23 Thus, the problem is not merely one of police misconduct. Rather, it involves the real danger of undiscoverable police
misconduct: The practical impossibility of the courts monitoring
the legal process of the passage of persons presumed innocent,
taken into police custody, subjected to secret interrogation, then
18 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
19 Id. at 446.
20

Id.

21
22

Id. at 448 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)).
Id. at 448-55.

23

Id. at 448.
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emerging as confessed criminals, ready for perfunctory trials and
sure punishment. Underlying Miranda was a clear assumption
that we have a serious police problem in America requiring an
extraordinary legal remedy.
This issue, as much as any other, divides our population today as much as it did in 1966. It divides our students as well and
is an important issue for debate. Students often divide on prosecutor/defense attorney lines, depending on career aspirations.
This division, however, is too simplistic. For example, at least in
New York City, prosecutors are sometimes very hard on the police, having tired of high levels of police misconduct. Accordingly, a good prosecutor should ask the arresting officer a
number of difficult questions if there is a suspicion of police misconduct, and should not hesitate to drop criminal charges or initiate legal proceedings when misconduct is likely. For
prospective defense attorneys, this underscores the human dimension of defendants in custody: They are in highly vulnerable
positions. They need help to protect their constitutional rights.
While this division is simplistic-and I would like to think
that conservatives think it is important to take serious legal precautions to protect the integrity of our system of justice, including the recognition that the police need to be seriously watched
by the courts-it is real. There is no greater reflection of this
concern than the current trend of United States Supreme Court
decisions skirting the issue of police misconduct. Rhode Island v.
Innis2 4 is almost invariably the first case studied after Miranda.
The case involved a man suspected of killing a cab driver with a
shotgun. Rather than directly interrogating the suspect, one police officer "casually observe[d]" to another officer that small
children might find the gun and hurt themselves. The suspected
murderer, caring deeply about children, revealed the location of
the gun. Justice Potter Stewart (who had dissented in Miranda)
held that the patrolman's famous statement, hoping that little
children would not find Innis' shotgun, was not custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda because it was just a dialogue between two officers, neither intended nor reasonably
likely to elicit a response. 5 I ask my students whether they really
believe that the officer did not intend to provoke a response. Nobody ever believes that the officers are as innocent as Stewart
thinks. Did Stewart really believe it? How do you tell? The es24

446 U.S. 291 (1980).
302-03.

25 Id. at
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sence of Miranda was the belief that, precisely because of the secrecy of police work, the courts needed to provide a fair process
that would eliminate the need for case by case determinations of
police credibility.
The problem of legally controlling police misconduct is, in
itself, value-laden and politically loaded. How do we teach this?
Here I must say that I have always found both Dudley and Stephens
and "Speluncean explorers" boring to teach because those situations are so far-fetched in real life that it is difficult to seriously
discuss cannibalism in coming to terms with the humanity of the
necessity defense.26 It is clear to me and all of my students that
we would die before we would eat our brothers and sisters.
"Dirty Harry," on the other hand, presents a real issue, a moral
problem for the nineties. 7 A bad criminal, the worst we can conceptualize (and the actor who plays opposite Clint Eastwood portrays the sleaziest human possible), has a little girl buried in a
box with only a few hours of air left. Inspector Harry Callahan,
one of the country's greatest police officers, has used great creativity and imagination to solve the case and save the child's life.
Unfortunately, the suspect, though in custody, won't tell. Harry
makes a hard choice: He tortures a confession out of the suspect,
kills him, saves the child, and turns in his badge. Justice and humanity triumph. The law is a nice thing, but it is not practical in
the face of a rising crime problem. The facts of Dirty Harry are
not the best for class discussion. For example, as one of my students pointed out (in a tongue in cheek parody of modern
Supreme Court reasoning), under Quarles,28 there may well be an
"emergency" or "public safety" exception to the Fifth AmendThe Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). A.W. BRIAN SIMP(1984) is a legal history of the case, involving a decision by a group of starving sailors adrift in a lifeboat to kill and eat the
cabin boy. Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616
(1949) poses a parallel hypothetical case, involving explorers lost in a cave.
27 As may be obvious from my sub-headings, I try to use images from popular
culture in constructing hypotheticals to encourage discussion in my classroom.
Surely it is not farfetched to see the image of Dirty Harry as underlying the majority
opinion in Miranda. Ironically, this image is not far from the dissenting opinions
either, for we expect our police to be both tough and willing to sacrifice legal niceties for the pragmatic requirements of the real world in carrying out the difficultjob
of controlling crime. This is the whole problem underlying the Miranda doctrine.
28 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). In Quarles, the Court delineated
this "public safety" exception, and noted that "concern for public safety must be
paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated
in Miranda." Id. at 653.
26

SON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW
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ment that would give Harry more latitude here than in an ordinary interrogation.
Contrary to the factual limitations of the Dirty Harry scenario, the facts in Brewer v. Williams2 9 or Arizona v. Fulminante31 can
be reworked to provide for great discussion. Both cases were
driven by their facts, tragic and brutal murders of children. Williams allegedly murdered a little girl just before Christmas, leaving her body in a field, her parents desperate with worry.3 '
Fulminante allegedly murdered his own eleven year old stepdaughter after making her beg for her life. 32 While both convictions were reversed by the Supreme Court on 5 to 4 votes, the
dissenters were, in both cases, willing to construct elaborate denials of police misconduct in an effort to let the convictions
stand. Dirty Harry comes out looking like rather ordinary police
work. My students do the same thing-in fact, I think they develop better rationales for admitting the results of egregious police behavior than the Supreme Court.3 3 Ultimately, Williams
was retried and convicted without using his incriminating statement. There was no evidence against Fulminante other than his
confession, so he was freed.
This image of ordinary police work frustrated by laws that
"handcuff" the police is at the core of the political opposition to
Miranda. This idea is replete with other images as well. Police
work, it is argued, cannot be understood by judges. Police work
is inherently dangerous, carried out in virtual "combat" conditions. Criminals do not play by Marquess of Queensbury rules
and crime cannot be controlled by police who are forced to play
by those rules. Constitutional rights must be "balanced" against
society's need to effectively control crime. The public expects to
be protected, and popular support for aggressive police tactics to
control crime is high. There can be no question that much of
what is behind the current Court's slow but steady undermining
of Miranda is a set of favorable images of the police that essentially denies that there is a "police problem," a denial traceable
to the dissenting opinions in Miranda. Justice Clark, for example,
430 U.S. 387 (1977).
S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
31 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 390-93.
32 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
33 Jeremy Bentham, among the greatest English language legal scholars, constructed quite an elaborate defense of the need for some forms of torture - carefully controlled, of course - in our jurisprudence. See W.L. Twining and P.E.
Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 305 (1973).
29

30 111
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wrote that he was "proud" of police agencies, whose work was
"not fairly characterized by the Court's opinion." 34 In this view,
Dirty Harry is not only a good cop, but one who deserves the
assistance and support of the Supreme Court. The modern Miranda cases provide that assistance and support.
The Supreme Court's support for the police has led to conclusions that deliberately ignore Dirty Harry's misconduct, even
where shown. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for example, in Moran v. Burbine, dismissed a pattern of police misconduct, that involved both repeated lying to the suspect and the denial of access
to a lawyer, pointing out that "[n]othing in the Constitution vests
in [the Supreme Court] the authority to mandate a code of behavior for state officials wholly unconnected to any federal right
....
Of course all these cases are connected to federal rights.
Such language, such consistent deference to egregious police
misconduct, can only encourage more of the invisible police behavior that Miranda sought to bring to the surface, and attempted
to control. Dissenting in Brewer, Chief Justice Warren Burger
stretched this reasoning to its farthest limits by denying that Captain Leaming's carefully thought-out "Christian burial" speech,
which Leaming admitted on the witness stand was intended to
elicit an incriminating statement, had actually been an interrogation of defendant Williams.36 Thus, a police officer's admission
that he had intentionally engaged in an illegal interrogation was
not dispositive for the Chief Justice.
Who are the police? What is the police institution? What
are its legal functions? How does the police function relate to
the rest of the legal system? My reading of all Supreme Court
cases is colored by my training as a sociologist of policing.
Fourth Amendment cases are as replete with incredible police
testimony as Fifth Amendment cases. Why won't the courts address this issue more directly? Why do the courts defer to the
police, even in the face of misconduct? An obvious answer is that
courts are making policy choices that strengthen the hand of law
enforcement, making it easier for the police to get information
from suspects. What do the police routinely do in gathering evidence? How often do they physically or verbally abuse suspects?
34

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 500 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting).

35 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986).

36 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 416 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Yale
Kamisar has carefully analyzed Captain Leaming's interrogation of Williams in
Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND

CONFESSIONS

117-29 (1980).
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Various studies show that police violence is depressingly common, hardly an aberration. Such violence has become incorporated into the police function in American society. We expect
"tough" police, the kind we see every night on television. We
make excuses for their violence.
Ironically, perhaps a part of Miranda's weakness as doctrine
is that it did not address this issue with sufficient directness.
Why, for example, did Earl Warren, a rough and tumble prosecutor in Oakland in the 1930's, a time and place where the police
surely practiced the "third degree" regularly, rely on a few
passages from a police manual to make his argument that police
abuse of accused persons in custody was a problem? Surely he
could have used real facts, citing case after case of the custodial
abuse to coerce confessions. Did he hedge for political reasons?
Did he have a shaky majority behind his 5 to 4 opinion? While
police work provides the basis for virtually every criminal case
that students study, rarely do we see a serious examination of the
processes of policing, legal processes that are arguably of more
legal importance on a day-to-day level than the legal work of
judges and lawyers. What is the reality of being in police custody
in a large American city in the 1990's? It is mistreatment, sleep
deprivation, interrogation by trick, being shunted from one
filthy, crowded cell to another, day after day, minutes in court
separated by weeks in jail, moments with legal aid lawyers who
are sympathetic but powerless to intervene, separation from
friends and loved ones, and the imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury while in jail. Under such conditions another
form of confession, the plea bargain, is most often the only way
out.
Miranda was deeply rooted not only in police misconduct,
but in the very difficult problems of discovering and controlling
police misconduct. The constitutional roots of Miranda were in
Brown v. Mississippi. 7 In that 1936 case, three black tenant farmers were arrested and tortured until they confessed to the murder
of a white cotton planter. The three were produced in court
barely a week after the murder with the markings of torture still
on their bodies. They had been beaten, hanged, burned and brutalized, and all had confessed to the killing. Future Mississippi
Senator John Stennis prosecuted the case, winning a jury verdict
37

297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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of guilty with only thirty minutes of deliberation. 8 The relevant
legal test at the time was whether the confessions were "voluntary." But the problem with the "voluntariness" test was that
there were only two sets of witnesses, police and criminal suspects. In 1930's Mississippi, with the markings of torture on the
defendants' bodies, the Supreme Court could effectively apply a
voluntariness test to the particular set of facts presented. Today,
it simply cannot do so with the full range of atrocities that come
to the courts from the basements of police stations all over modern America.
Why is Miranda our most cited case? Precisely because it
goes to the heart of this process, providing a legal window
through which every defendant who makes a potentially incriminating statement can challenge the police investigatory process
that led to his conviction. Thus, Miranda is indispensable as a
tool for holding the police institution accountable-or at least for
forcing Dirty Harry to make the choice to turn in his badge, and
to stop being a legal actor.
II.

THELMA AND LOUISE

As much as Miranda was about police misconduct, it was also
about catching criminals. The fear of crime has taken such wild
dimensions in American society that a "dangerous drug" exception to the Constitution has allegedly arisen, or so defense lawyers have observed about this apocryphal Fourth Amendment
principle. I teach in New York City where, if I chose, I could
barely manage to teach the criminal cases being described in the
daily newspapers. Often students tell me that they cannot objectively discuss cases because they, or some member of their family, were victims of crime. I tell them that Methias Warren, a
retired railroad worker in Bakersfield, California, was brutally
murdered one day, beaten to death at the age of seventy-three by
a robber who was never caught. 39 This must have hurt his son
Earl Warren a great deal, for he appears to have been a very sensitive and humane person. For me, the Warren example means
that while we need to feel our pain, we must be careful not to let
our pain cause us to hurt other people.
Law students are often very hard on criminal defendants. In
some courses I conduct a mini-simulation on plea bargaining,
38 This case is analyzed in detail in RICHARD C. CORTNER, A "ScoTrSBORO" CASE
IN Mississippi: THE SUPREME COURT AND Brown v. Mississippi (1986).
39 LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 113 (1983).
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pairing students as prosecutors and defense lawyers, handing a
case file to each, and sending them to the hallways and bathrooms for ten minutes to "settle" the case. The unarmed defendant, a purse-snatcher with one prior conviction, who steals
$50 and somehow pushes a young woman down, breaking her
arm, receives wildly disparate sentences ranging up to ten years
in prison. I ask: What if he were your brother? What would you
do then? I would like to ask individual students about their sisters and brothers and the trouble they got in, but I respect their
privacy. I try hard to humanize everybody in all the cases I teach.
It is a difficult task because some of the behavior is difficult to
humanize. And, like many people who work in the criminal justice system, I fall back on bad humor sometimes, not trying to be
offensive, but trying to protect myself from some of what I would
feel if I stopped to feel everything I should about every case.
How much time would Thelma and Louise have gotten if
they had simply surrendered when they were finally surrounded?
Why did two bright young women choose to die rather than face
our legal institutions? The answer is obvious: They faced a cruel
criminal justice system that offers both the longest sentences in
the world and inhuman prison conditions. While, in theory, Louise faced the death penalty, such a penalty would ordinarily not
fall on a woman, even one who killed a man after a fight in a
saloon parking lot, nor on a respectable person-that is, someone without a record of violent criminal behavior. They faced
many years in jail on charges of arson, armed robbery, assaulting
an officer, attempted murder and manslaughter. It is a useful exercise in criminal law to let the students take the statute book and
simply list the possible criminal charges: There are dozens. All
this from just a few bad days in the lives of two ordinary people.
The movie is some kind of comedy, but it feels like the kind of
thing that could happen to anybody, thousands of similar bad
days, filling up our prisons with fairly ordinary people. When I
take my criminal procedure class to visit a prison I have a goal
beyond their learning about prisons. I want them to see who is in
there, so that the endless cases that wind up "affirmed" have a
clear meaning: People go to jail for very long periods of time.
I do not like the way Ernest Miranda was presented in his
case-and it was "his" case because it was his life. It is a tough
discussion when the goal is to humanize Miranda. He confessed
to raping an eighteen-year old woman. A refreshment stand
worker in a downtown Phoenix movie theater, she was getting off
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the 11:45 p.m. bus she took home after work when a car pulled in
front of her. A man walked toward her and grabbed her. He
forced her into the car, and tied her hands behind her. Lying
face down on the back seat, her legs were tied together, as a cold
object was placed against her neck. She was driven out into the
desert and raped. While she was dressing, the man asked her for
money and she turned over four dollars. She was then driven
40
back to where she had been abducted and dropped off.
Ernest Miranda was twenty-three years old when arrested for
this rape. An eighth grade drop-out, he had a juvenile record for
car theft, burglary and attempted rape, including a year in a reformatory. He had served 13 months in a federal prison for interstate transportation of stolen cars at age 19, but had not been
in trouble since his release. He lived with a woman in a common
law marriage, supporting her two children and one of the
couple's own by working on a loading dock at a trucking company. He was connected to the rape by a fortuity: A week after
the rape, the victim and her brother saw a car they believed to be
the car she was kidnapped in-it was an old Packard. They reported the license number to the police, missing one number.
The police checked vehicles with approximate descriptions, and
turned up Miranda. The police went to his house in mid-morning and asked Miranda, who had worked a twelve hour night shift
ending at 8 a.m., to come to the station for questioning. Not
knowing that he could refuse, Miranda went to the station. He
was put in a line-up with three other Mexican-American men.
The victim failed to identify him. When he was returned to the
interrogation room he was falsely told by the police that he had
been identified as the rapist. After two hours of interrogation, he
signed a confession admitting the rape. As interrogations go, it
was routine. Miranda was opened up with a standard police trick,
a strategic lie straight from the interrogation manuals that Warren later cited in his opinion. He was not threatened or beaten,
nor subjected to a lengthy questioning. Based on this interrogation, Miranda was convicted of kidnapping and rape, and sentenced to prison for concurrent twenty to thirty year terms.4
The Supreme Court's opinion, after analyzing the dangers of
police trickery as described in the police manuals, presented Miranda's interrogation as a straightforward two hour process; the
Court failed to mention the police trick, i.e., the lie about the
40

Id. at 3-4.

41 Id. at 8-12.
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victim's identification.42
Applying the exclusionary rule to his confession, the
Supreme Court overturned Miranda's conviction. A convicted
rapist was set free because Justice Cardozo's proverbial "constable ha[d] blundered. ' 43 Miranda's release raised a whole range
of issues regarding the function of the exclusionary rule. If its
purpose is simply to deter police misconduct, should the exclusionary rule apply if the police were acting in "good faith" within
the bounds of the law as they knew it, as clearly the Phoenix police were in Miranda? Or is the exclusionary rule here aimed at
the problem of wrongful convictions, the likelihood that an innocent person might confess? Indeed, was Miranda innocent?
Here some student invariably takes the position that it is impossible that a person would confess to something that he did not do,
at least short of police torture, which is virtually never at issue.
The class divides, again quite wildly, on this issue, with some incredible examples emerging. What is the real likelihood of a
false confession? Is that really the issue? Think, for example, of
the Dirty Harry conundrum, where torture gains an accurate confession. So, Miranda must be about police process after all.
Beyond these considerations are considerably 'loftier policy
issues surrounding the exclusionary rule, such as the idea that
the rule protects the integrity of the legal system by insuring that
illegally gained evidence does not contaminate the process. This
in turn opens up another set of issues about what is wrong with
the police vigorously going after confessions. Why should criminal suspects be protected against their own weaknesses? In
short, the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule can look much different than the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule: Ernest Miranda was not Dolly Mapp.4 4 Her home was her castle and
everybody can understand why lying officers with phony search
warrants deserved to have the courts toss out their ill-gotten
gain. It seems like a large group of students never quite grasp
the rationale for the Fifth Amendment. It seems counter-intuitive: Why not just let polite police officers ask questions for a few
hours? These students wind up not very far from Justice John
Harlan's seeming uncertainty about the whole idea of the Fifth
Amendment in Byers.4 5 Isn't the core of the Fifth Amendment
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491-92 (1966).
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926).
44 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (HarlanJ. concurring).
42
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protection against inquisitorial or Star Chamber proceedings
that no longer exist? In fact, don't our predominate political theories go in the opposite direction: In a democratic society people
should willingly cooperate with the police. What purpose is
served in our system of justice when a defendant can stand
against the state, fully protected from the state's awesome power
by a simple declaration that he does not want to talk to the police? What kind of populism is this? Here I clothe myself-as I
rarely do-in the political world of the founding mothers and fathers, waxing eloquent about how awful the British kings were
and how important the Fifth Amendment was in English legal
history but, I hate to say, it does not really take with my students.
Last year, in complete frustration, I handed Leonard Levy's Origins of the Fifth Amendment 46 to a student and told him to read it.
Ernest Miranda did not fare much better under American
law than Thelma and Louise did. He had been in the Arizona
State Prison at Florence for three years when the Supreme Court
handed down the decision in his case. His father bought a bottle
of Scotch to celebrate his son's freedom, but he never was to
drink it. All the decision got Ernest Miranda was another trial.
Without his confession the state's case appeared hopeless. The
chaos in Miranda's life, however, betrayed him. While he was in
prison his common law wife had had a child by another man. Miranda, jealous and angry, and believing he would be released,
petitioned a court for custody of his child, arguing that his wife
was an unfit mother. Perhaps afraid, the woman delivered Ernest
Miranda into the hands of the police: She testified that he had
admitted the rape to her, and tried to get her to convince the
victim to drop the charges. After the jury deliberated only an
hour and twenty-three minutes-barely enough time, in the lawyer's joke, to elect a foreman and vote-Miranda was again convicted of kidnapping and rape. The judge gave him the same
twenty to thirty year sentences.47
After serving nine years, Miranda was paroled from prison in
1972, his life in ruins. Feeling that he had been left behind by his
own famous case, he sold cards bearing the Miranda warning on
the steps of the Maricopa County Courthouse. His notoriety had
only negative effects: He was followed by the police, and lost his
driver's license to large numbers of traffic tickets. Finally, one of
these traffic stops produced three amphetamines and a .38 cali46 LEONARD W.

LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE Firm

47 LIVA BAKER,

MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS

(2d ed. 1986).
191-93 (1983).
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ber pistol. Parole was revoked and Miranda went back to prison
for another year. On January 31, 1974, thirty-four-year old Ernest Miranda was stabbed to death in a barroom fight.48 Winning
his Supreme Court appeal had done him no good at all. I take
my criminal procedure class to a maximum security prison so
they can see how our society warehouses a half-million Mirandas
a year.
Ernest Miranda's sad story raises questions about the victim.
Rape is a horrible crime, one that subjugates women, holding
them in fear, denying them equal participation in American society. All of us would like to have a society without rape. All of us
would use the criminal justice system-or something like it-to
punish or incapacitate rapists. Rape is poorly taught in most
criminal law courses, and some of the underlying issues often
emerge in criminal procedure. While the subject matter of criminal law and that of criminal procedure appear very different to
law professors, students do not always perceive the differences.
Both are about crime. Criminal procedure, simply, involves the
fair application of the criminal law.
What about the victim in criminal procedure classes? We do
not even know the name of Miranda's victim, or, at least, the woman he was convicted of raping. I ask the class to think about
precisely how one might change the law of criminal procedure to
take more account of the victims. Can you balance constitutional
rights against victims' rights? How are victims' rights different
from (or similar to) broader social concerns? Do the very real
injuries to victims require reducing the constitutional rights of
defendants? Here the discussion often leads to the legal problem
of child abuse cases. In discussing Bouknight, a difficult case in
which the state attempted to compel a mother suspected of murdering her child to produce the child in family court, one student
proposed an exception to the Fifth Amendment in child abuse
cases.49 The class divided on the issue. Amazingly, many students simply could not see the Fifth Amendment issue: The state
is completely free to prosecute the mother using any legal devices under its control. What the state cannot do is force her to
incriminate herself-even when her child is involved.
III.

GIDEON'S TRUMPET

While my students have a lot of trouble accepting Miranda as
48 Id. at 383, 408.
49

Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
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sound law, they like Gideon.5 ° Gideon is the ultimate American
criminal case: Everybody likes it, everybody believes that it stands
for something wonderful about our Constitution and our legal
system. It unites my class, with all the normally divided prosecutor and defense types agreeing on everything. The case is wonderful, almost a cliche: Truth, justice, and the American waythrough your court-appointed lawyer. It does not take long,
however, to blow this away. The simplest way to do this is to link
Gideon and Miranda. Following directly from Gideon, Miranda
constituted an attempt to extend the right to counsel afforded in
Gideon to police interrogations. Arguably, there are two Gideons,
one that all my students like, and one that divides them. The due
process issue in Gideon is easy. If you start with Powell v. Alabama,5 and look at something as simple as being on trial for your
life without a lawyer, the issue is not that the Supreme Court
somehow wildly undermined the police by granting this simple
right. Rather, the issue is how could it take so longw-until
1963-to do such a simple and honest thing. The answer lies in
more than the doctrine of selective incorporation. It has to do
with the systematic denial of basic civil rights and basic due process to poor people.
While Gideon made clear that due process requires a lawyer
in felony cases, there is a broader view of Gideon that looks to
fundamental equality and fairness in the criminal justice process,
and seeks to grant poor people at least some of the benefits that
wealthy people enjoy in our legal system. Here it is easy to make
a simple link between substantive criminal law and criminal procedure: While substantive criminal law embodies many values
that are neutral, such as prohibiting violent crimes and theft for
all people, regardless of race, creed, color, class and sex, the law
of criminal procedure clearly establishes an elaborate system of
protections for people who can make effective use of them, but
provides far fewer protections for those who cannot.5 2 A simple
barroom fight and killing between two ex-convicts, for example,
would easily produce a manslaughter conviction (often in the
form of a plea bargain forced by a first degree murder charge),
50

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

51 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
52 Criminal law and criminal procedure are closely linked in practice, but rarely
linked in theory. Doctrinally, the two areas have no relationship to each other. We
need to rethink these linkages. See David Nelken, Criminal Law and CriminalJustice:
Some Notes on their Irrelation, in CRIMINAL LAW AND JUSTICE 139 (I.H. Dennis ed.,
1987).
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while the same killing between two law professors would be unlikely to produce a serious criminal conviction.53
Miranda is arguably as much about equality and fairness as it
is about the Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination. Miranda is about poor people being treated fairly and with
respect by the police, given some of the same benefits routinely
afforded higher status defendants. Part of the Miranda problem
is that these values are no longer favored by conservative federal
courts.
Discussion of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment roots of Miranda makes much of this clear. This is doctrinally important because the relationship between these two amendments was
obscured in Brewer v. Williams.5" We emerge from that case,
seemingly, with separate Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel, a distinction that makes no sense at all. Fully half of the
Miranda warning has to do with right to counsel: Essentially, the
warning informs a person of his Gideon rights very early in the
process, so that an attorney can meaningfully protect a suspect's
constitutional rights. Yet, because the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel only attaches at the preliminary hearing stage, we preserve the fiction that the right to counsel that has' attached is a
more limited Fifth Amendment right to counsel. While the Sixth
Amendment right goes to the trial process, and is designed to
insure fairness and integrity in that process, the Fifth Amendment right is narrower and more personal, and is designed only
to protect the suspect against police coercion.
Students rightfully have a great deal of trouble with this
idea, depending, of course, on how they read Miranda. The
Gideon roots of Miranda mean that the lawyer is present in the
police station to fully protect the defendant's rights, and, being
available at an earlier stage, also to provide a more effective defense at trial. I ask my students what they think a lawyer does
when she arrives at the police station to give advice to a defendant in custody. Does the lawyer limit her advice to telling the
client not to discuss anything with the police? It is clear that the
53 Rather than use nameless, faceless hypotheticals in my criminal law and criminal procedure classes, I make sure that all of my hypothetical crimes involve law
professors-my friends and colleagues-committing a wide range of criminal offenses. Students are surprised, some are offended. My point is simple: The law
school is a community and crime is unfortunately present in every American community. I want to avoid stereotypes about people who somehow "look like
criminals."
54 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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opposite happens: This contact is the lawyer's earliest exposure
to the case, a time when all the evidence is freshest. Who are the
witnesses? How do they see the case? What evidence do the police have? What scientific tests are they going to do? What tests
should the defense do? This is simply mounting an effective defense, a right rooted in Gideon and the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
And what does a free lawyer do for most criminal defendants? At least Gideon got a trial. Now most defendants-95% in
some jurisdictions, including New York-plead guilty in only the
most perfunctory of legal proceedings. Sociological literature on
the plea bargaining process tells the story: The average criminal
defendant comes to court four or five times, for an average of
four or five minutes, and is sentenced to four or five years.5 5
Nice symmetry. One does not have to be a genius to quickly conclude that the police are not that good, and that good defense
lawyers could do more for these defendants. These data attest to
the complete failure of the legal process in criminal cases, a due
process failure that has occurred with full representation by
counsel.
I have no idea what Clarence Gideon looked like. Now he
looks like Henry Fonda, who heroically played him in the movie.
The real Gideon, like Miranda, had a hard life: a convicted pool
hall burglar, he was a recidivist who had spent a lot of time in jail.
Not only did he do a great job defending himself at trial, but
Gideon also successfully petitioned the United States Supreme
Court. It is clear that his case was won from the moment the
Court decided to take it: The right to counsel in criminal cases
was an idea whose time had arrived. Why didn't the Court let
Gideon argue his own case? Unlike Miranda, he was set free,
along with thousands of other felons convicted without attorneys.
IV.

THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY

So far, we have not addressed Miranda doctrine, the evolution of the basic legal principles that derived from the case. My
students cherish black letter law. I tell them, up front, that while
there is a black letter Miranda principle, it is an inadequate and
static understanding of the issues. I want them to see Miranda as
a method of inquiry inside a complex set of policies. I teach
these through the Justices, reading closely the majority and dis55 Maureen Mileski, Courtroom Encounters, 5 LAw & Soc'y REV. 473, 514 (1971).
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senting opinions in each of the cases. Students become accustomed to the world views and the legal reasoning processes of
each of the Justices that has contributed significantly to Miranda
over the years. This is teaching legal history while it is being
written because the Justices we study closely-including many of
the giants of the twentieth-century Court-represent the full
range of judicial philosophies that exist in the currently
politicized Court: Warren, Douglas, Black, Frankfurter, Harlan,
Stewart, White, Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and
Stevens. Because we read so many closely divided opinions-almost all are 5 to 4 and 6 to 3 decisions, commonly with three or
more opinions-we see each Justice repeatedly: Stewart in Massiah, Innis, and Brewer; Marshall and Brennan, dissenting consistently in case after case, reminding the Court of Miranda's original
aspirations; Warren at his finest in Miranda; Rehnquist, as only he
can be, in Fulminante, Quarles, and Bradshaw; O'Connor in Burbine
and Elstad; Scalia and his sudden switching of sides in Fulminante.
All this judicial activity in such a small space brings to life the
social and political context of Miranda doctrine.
It becomes clear to the students that there is no doctrinal
accounting for this procession of decisions. Even, for example, a
simple case like Innis, which some black letter texts cite only for
its definition of the "functional equivalent of interrogation," is,
conceptually, totally inconsistent with Miranda: One cannot rely
on a police officer's intent or expectations in determining the admissibility of a confession because such an inquiry necessarily requires a case by case determination of such intent, precisely the
problem of the old "voluntariness" test that Miranda replaced.
Similarly, the Court's consistent lowering of the waiver standard
for Miranda rights requires a case by case analysis that turns heavily on police versions of occurrences that are often sharply inconsistent with the suspect's version. This process, veiled in secrecy,
cannot protect a defendant's rights.
I try to personalize the Justices in an effort to link their opinions with the social and political contexts that produced them,
spending a lot of time on Earl Warren in Miranda, Black in Gideon,
Douglas's magnificent dissents in Fifth Amendment cases in the
1950's, Stewart, Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. I try to be
fair in looking at the policy underpinnings of opinions that I do
not agree with, but I am also tough on opinions I like. The students understand that I think they can read Scalia and Rehnquist
as well as I can, and can put what they think the two Justices are
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saying in some kind of meaningful context. These Justices are
the products of an age, filtering holdings and doctrines through
their own consciences and imaginations. I quote Robert Cover's
wonderful essay, "Violence and the Word," looking at the great
violence that Justices effect in their judicial roles.56 Chief Justice
Rehnquist does not have to stay up late at night faxing denials of
stays of executions. He does it because he believes in the death
penalty.
Justice William Douglas quoted Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes as having said to him: "At the constitutional level where
we work, ninety percent of any decision is emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reasons for supporting our predilections." 57 My students are accustomed to analyzing cases in a
formulaic way: Facts, issue, holding, reasoning, policy. I try hard
to move them beyond this. Miranda cases make this easy. At the
outset, the whole idea of Miranda is that you really cannot even
tell what the facts are: The secrecy of the police process is the
underlying problem. I ask students to write out the holding in
Miranda. Most write out the warning. Now, if we read Michigan v.
tat the Miranda warning is not even part of the
Tucker, 58 it seems that
Miranda holding, a conclusion that follows even from the original
opinion's dicta that some other method of protecting Fifth
Amendment rights against custodial interrogation might be developed.59 Rather, Tucker held that the Miranda warning was
"merely prophylactic." Everybody knows what a prophylactic is:
There is nothing "merely prophylactic" about a prophylactic.
They are simple devices that protect the lives and bodies of real
human beings. The prophylactic discussion in Tucker goes off in
all kinds of directions. People produce them in class. Justice
Rehnquist picked the wrong metaphor.
The Miranda holding is not hard to find. Students quickly
learn to look in the early pages of a case for some statement of
the holding, and there it is on page 444. The problem with the
holding stated here is that it is the longest holding that I know of
in a constitutional case: It runs nearly a full page. As though its
length is not enough, the holding further states that it "will be
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 8 (1980).
58 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
59 The Miranda Court required the warnings or "a fully effective equivalent."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). Nothing has ever been found to be
that equivalent.
56

57 WILLIAM
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spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow."6
Even in summary, I cannot easily write the holding on the board.
It is a holding from hell, too long and complex to quickly put in a
notebook or a brief. Like the hundred plus law review articles
and the 33,000 plus cases that cite to Miranda, even the case's
holding is the stuff of legends and imagination rather than rote
formulas.
What is a holding anyway? I try to get my students to move
away from relying on simple formulas. My argument is that, in
Miranda, the whole case is the holding. As though that argument
is not enough, I also argue that the case's logic, reasoning and
underlying assumptions, whether explicit or implicit, are also
part of the holding. Students are very skeptical at this stage,
afraid they are studying black letter law with some kind of communist. So, together we go through the whole case, looking at
every single argument or issue that is raised-the opinion and
the dissents. This is the only case for which I do this. It only
takes a couple of hours: It gets faster after you get going. I emphasize the value and integrity of each person's judgment: Read
the case carefully, think about what it means, be independent and
critical, and trust your imagination and legal reasoning skills.
You do not need to trust your teacher. You can figure this out
for yourself.
Once you have read Miranda closely, the cases that interpret
Miranda are much easier to teach. The current cases separate Miranda from its roots. Miranda was a method and an approach, as
much as a representation of black letter law. Yet, the Rehnquist
Court continues to construct increasingly narrow versions of
what it thinks Miranda held; such constructions are increasingly
farther afield from the core problem with which Miranda attempted to grapple. The "new voluntariness" approach is easy
to see through: One student asked, "Isn't coercion all that is
left?" Another student asked if Stewart in his Innis opinion had
read Miranda. The answer is that Justice Stewart carefully read
Miranda, but he never agreed with it. The current Court has read
Miranda too, but does not agree with it either. What the Court
does with the case involves a wide variety of legal devices, some
doctrinal, others social and political.
Arizona v. Fulminante6 ' is one of several recent cases that interpret Miranda in ways that approach the bizarre. Oreste Fulmi60 Id. at 444.
61 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
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nante was serving time in a federal prison for possession of
firearms. Police suspected that he might have murdered his stepdaughter but had no evidence. Anthony Sarivola, a former police
officer, was doing time for extortion in the same prison, but had
become an FBI informer. Agents assigned Sarivola the task of
getting a confession from Fulminante. He used an ingenious device: He told Fulminante that he would let everybody in the
prison know that Fulminante was a child murderer unless he put
himself under Sarivola's protection and told him about the crime.
Fulminante did so. Four Justices thought this was clearly a coerced confession: Everybody knows what happens to child molesters in prison, and Fulminante had confessed to a paid agent,
one who had been given information by the FBI to coerce an admission. Four Justices thought that it was a voluntary confession
because the record did not show that Fulminante actually perceived an immediate threat to his physical security. Five Justices
were prepared, in any case, to apply the "harmless error" rule to
a coerced confession, breaking a long-standing legal tradition
that had been thought fundamental to American justice. Only
Justice Scalia's belief that, while a coerced confession could indeed be "harmless error," this particular coerced confession was
not, led to a 5 to 4 reversal of Fulminante's conviction.
While this opinion will probably support a number of scholarly articles, its essence is that most of the Court appears to believe that a confession can be voluntary in spite of this degree of
coercion and that, even if technically involuntary, it may still be
admissible if "harmless error." Nothing in Fulminante can be reconciled with Miranda. Indeed, the case is almost impossible even
to read. While the case cannot be understood doctrinally, it is
not hard to untangle politically. On one hand, Miranda is being
narrowed almost to its original context, establishing an orderly
police interrogation process, complete with plenty of politeness
and a careful reading of the Miranda warnings from a card. On
the other hand, the factual context of any interrogation is open to
case by case interpretation, in a way that the Miranda Court
thought was impossible. How can we ever know what fear a suspect such as Fulminante actually feels? Ask him? Ask the police?
On a case by case basis?
V.

CONCLUSION: WILD AT HEART

Teaching Miranda requires staying abreast of all this chaos.
Yet we call the process "the rule of law." The reason there are
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more than 33,000 Miranda cases is that the case itself cuts so
close to the heart of so many factually complex criminal cases.
These cases, in turn, represent all the legal and political complexity of crime in American society. Teaching Miranda is teaching legal history while it is happening.
Ernest Miranda was not James Earl Gideon: He was an inarticulate young rapist, not a mellow old burglar. We cannot cast
some Hollywood actor as Miranda in a moving story of his life.
Teaching Miranda requires bringing the belly of the beast, the
underside of American society and American law, into the law
school classroom, a difficult meeting of dozens of United States
Supreme Court cases with criminal defendants. Instead of the
dull and lifeless images common to most of the cases we teach in
law school, Miranda is the stuff of movies and television. I'm terribly afraid that soon I will see a made for television Sunday night
movie on ABC called "Fulminante"-complete with a grin on the
defendant's face as he walks out of prison, freed by soft lawyers
and judges, and ready to murder another little girl. The challenge is to seize these images and use them in the educational
process, to bring them into the classroom.
"Wild At Heart" is a film embodying many legal themes. Yet
the law is completely irrelevant as the characters make their
choices, with cops and parole violators operating on the same
legal and moral level. It is a wild country. We have a wild legal
culture. It is difficult to make sense of all the contradictory
strains that compose our legal culture. On one hand, the United
States probably has more "law" than any country in the world.
And, as de Tocqueville observed, the American people have "a
singular attachment to the formalities of law."'6 2 Legal historians
of the Wild West and the frontier's logging and mining enterprises have noted the extent to which the law was called on to
structure those social worlds.63 Today, we have more lawyers
than any country in the world. Within our country lawyers have
more power than any other profession. Yet, at the same time,
62 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 355 (1984). This observation particularly refers to the treatment of Native Americans, but it clearly reflects
de Tocqueville's view of the tendency of Americans to convert all issues ultimately
to legal questions.
63 See GORDEN M. BAKKEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW ON THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN
FRONTIER (1983); JOHN P. REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL (1980); JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN, 1836-1915
(1964).
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our culture has an approach to law that is cynical and pragmatic:
Law is a problem, an obstacle to be overcome. Crime is attractive, yet we despise those labelled "criminal." Legal ethics is a
contradiction in terms, and virtually no one believes that lawyers
honor their Code of Professional Responsibility.
This is a long way around to a point, but both the problem
and the promise of Miranda is that the case proposes to interject
law into a process that is both lawless and suspect. Thus, Miranda itself is suspect, both too much and too little law at the
same time. Many issues come from this. For example, the major
impact of the Miranda warning may be symbolic, a reminder to
both the police officer and the suspect that law governs their
meeting, even though both probably know this principle on some
level, and neither intends to honor what law means in that context. On another level, the Court's requirement that police officers "give" suspects their rights implicitly recognizes the
amount of law that resides in the most routine police encounter,
conferring upon every police officer the functions of lawyer,
judge and jury. Following Miranda, the police not only arrest
(and too often punish), but also "give" criminal suspects their
constitutional rights. Neither the courts nor the police, of
course, "give" Americans their rights. We are born with those
rights, but they are meaningless if we are either ignorant of them
or lack the power to call them into use. Miranda not only stands
for all this, but also shows us what we need to do to make law
meaningful and not a cynical enterprise. We need to keep Miranda alive and vibrant in the law school classroom.

